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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PRIME COMMERCIAL DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
TRIAL COURT'S RULING DISMISSING ITS COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE 
PRIME NEVER CONSENTED TO THAT RULING. 
Prime Commercial clearly never waived its right to challenge on appeal the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment on Prime's counterclaim against Mitchell. Prime 
did not agree to pay Mitchell the amount he was seeking in his complaint until after the 
trial court had dismissed Prime's counterclaim, leaving Prime with no defense to 
Mitchell's claim. Prime plainly did not consent in any fashion to the order dismissing 
its counterclaim, so Prime is not prevented from raising a challenge to that order on 
this timely appeal. 
A. Agreeing to entry of a judgment does not waive a party's right to appeal 
where the trial court has already entered an order essentially destroying that 
party's defense, and where the judgment is agreed to simply to facilitate an 
appeal of that order. 
'"[T]here is an exception to the rule that a party may not appeal a consent 
judgment. If consent was merely given to facilitate an appeal following adverse deter-
mination of a critical issue, the party will not lose the right to be heard on appeal.'" 
Tudor Ranches. Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund. 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 577 (Ct. App. 
1998) (emphasis added) (quoting Building Industry Ass'n v. Citv of Camarillo. 718 
P.2d 68, 71 (Cal. 1986)). Courts from around the country have applied this principle 
and have allowed appeals in situations similar to the one presented in our case. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this exception to the "consent judg-
ment" rule. See State v. Trover. 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). In Trover, the court held 
that the State may appeal from a trial court's judgment dismissing criminal charges, 
even where the State itself requests that judgment to challenge an order suppressing 
evidence. The court downplayed any potential concern about allowing a party to appeal 
from a judgment that the party itself requested: 
We acknowledge that there is something counterintuitive about 
allowing a party to appeal from its own motion to dismiss. However, 
once it is clear that a suppression order destroys the prosecution's case, 
to forbid the State from dismissing and appealing would be to exalt form 
over substance. 
Id, at 531 n.2 (emphasis added). 
Although Trover was a criminal matter, several courts have applied the same 
reasoning for civil appeals. For example, the United States Supreme Court has allowed 
a plaintiff to appeal from a judgment of dismissal even though the plaintiff itself had 
instigated the dismissal after die trial court ruled against it on an important issue. See 
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.. 356 U.S. 677, 680-81 (1958). In Procter & 
Gamble, the trial court ordered the United States to produce certain materials in 
discovery. The United States asked the trial court to dismiss the case as a sanction for 
its own refusal to comply with that order. The trial court then dismissed the action, 
and the United States appealed. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was proper, 
explaining that "[w]hen the Government proposed dismissal for its failure to obey, it 
had lost on the merits and was only seeking an expeditious review." Id. at 681 
(emphasis added). 
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Further, in a case similar to our own, the Oregon Court of Appeals allowed a 
defendant to appeal from a "stipulated judgment." See IFG Leasing Co. v. Snvder. 
713 P.2d 630 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). In IFG Leasing, the court had granted summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant stipulated to the entry of judgment. 
In allowing the appeal to proceed, the court explained that "although defendant may 
have stipulated to the entry of judgment, he did not stipulate to its substance." Id. at 
631 n.l (emphasis added). 
Finally, in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. United States, 959 F.2d 960 
(Fed. Cir. 1992), the plaintiff was allowed to appeal from a dismissal that it sought 
after the trial court denied its motion for leave to amend. The St. Paul court explained 
that the plaintiff could pursue its appeal because its request for entry of judgment was 
simply a procedural step taken to obtain appellate review of the denial of the motion: 
St. Paul, by its request for dismissal, did not agree it was liable but only 
sought to avoid a trial on the merits of the existing count which otherwise 
would have been necessary in order to appeal the interlocutory order 
denying its motion to amend. While other procedures might have been 
followed, St. Pauls request for dismissal was not ff voluntary" in the sense 
of the general rule that a party may not appeal a judgment to which it 
consented. 
Id. at 962 (emphasis added).1 
1
 See also Paxton v. Stewart, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179 (Ct. App. 1998) (plaintiffs 
were allowed to appeal even though plaintiffs themselves had requested judgment be 
entered against them following the trial court's ruling excluding their expert testimony); 
Tudor Ranches, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 577 (plaintiff was allowed to appeal from a judg-
ment of dismissal it had requested after the trial court entered an order excluding a 
significant portion of plaintiffs evidence); Bunting v. Regional Trans. Dist., 919 P. 2d 
924 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (where the defendant stipulated to amount of attorney fees 
to be awarded plaintiff and judgment was entered accordingly, the defendant was 
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The rationale of Trover and the other cases discussed applies to Prime's appeal, 
and as such Prime has not waived its right to appeal. Mitchell's complaint against 
Prime sought approximately $20,000 in commissions, plus interest and attorney fees. 
(Complaint H 4-8, 15-17, R. 2-3, Exhibit 5 to Appellee's Brief ("App'ee Br. Ex. 5").) 
Prime filed its counterclaim, seeking a setoff for the amounts Mitchell improperly 
earned from his real estate development activities and from the post-termination 
transactions he made using Prime's customer lists, financial statements, and other 
materials. (Counterclaim, R. 35-37, App'ee Br. Ex. 6.) At the May 1998 hearing, the 
trial court orally dismissed Prime's counterclaim in its entirety. (Transcript, R. 955 at 
34:24 - 37:21.) Prime had no other defense to Mitchell's claim for commissions. 
Thus, because Mitchell was clearly going to recover the amount sought in his complaint 
against Prime, and because Prime no longer had a counterclaim pending against 
Mitchell, Prime simply stipulated to a final judgment in the exact amount sought in 
Mitchell's complaint to avoid the expense of trial and to allow for an appeal of the 
dismissal of the counterclaim. (Order and Judgment, R. 926-28, App'ee Br. Ex. 2.) 
Nowhere did Prime ever "consent" to the order dismissing its counterclaim. 
Instead, Prime's stipulation to the final judgment was simply a procedural step taken to 
facilitate appellate review of that order. The trial court's order had deprived Prime of 
allowed to appeal and challenge the plaintiffs right to attorney fees). The California 
Supreme Court colorfully explained the rationale behind this exception: "Thus a man 
who is told that he is going to be executed, but may have his choice of modes of 
execution between shooting and hanging, can scarcely be said to have consented to his 
execution if he express a preference for being shot." Placer County v. Freeman. 87 P. 
628, 629 (Cal. 1906). 
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its only defense, so there was no longer any point in litigating what was essentially an 
accounting issue. Under the authority discussed above, this does not constitute a 
waiver of Prime's right to appeal. To paraphrase from St. Paul. Prime, by agreeing to 
the final judgment, "only sought to avoid a trial on the merits of the existing count 
which otherwise would have been necessary in order to appeal the interlocutory order 
[granting summary judgment on its counterclaim]." St. Paul. 959 F.2d at 962. Or, to 
use the language from the United States Supreme Court, when Prime stipulated to entry 
of the final judgment, "it had lost on the merits and was only seeking an expeditious 
review" of the order granting summary judgment on its counterclaim. Procter & 
Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681. 
B. The authority relied on by Mitchell is distinguishable. 
The two Utah cases cited by Mitchell are distinguishable because in neither of 
those cases did an appellant stipulate to a final judgment after the trial court had entered 
an order effectively destroying the appellant's case. In Estate of Anderson. 671 P.2d 
165 (Utah 1983), both parties had expressly agreed that certain deeds were void, and 
the appellate court held that the trial court's ruling that the deeds were void could not 
be attacked on appeal. In Dalton v. Herold. 934 P.2d 649 (Utah 1997), the other case 
cited by Mitchell, the court simply stated in dicta that a party who accepts a remittitur 
or an additur order cannot challenge that order on appeal. Neither of those cases has 
any application to Prime's appeal of the trial court's order dismissing its counterclaim.2 
2
 See also Jensen v. Eddv. 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (1973). In Jensen, 
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C. The doctrine of waiver precludes a ruling that Prime waived its right to 
appeal. 
Mitchell's argument also fails under the general doctrine of waiver. To establish 
a waiver, a party must prove an "intentional relinquishment" of a known right, and the 
intent to relinquish must be "distinct." E.g.. Soters. Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
Prime distinctly intended to relinquish its right to challenge the order granting summary 
judgment against it. In fact, the clear evidence is that Prime did not waive its right to 
appeal the dismissal of its counterclaim.3 
the Utah Supreme Court found a similar exception to the general rule that a party who 
accepts payment of a judgment cannot appeal from that judgment. The plaintiffs in 
Jensen were awarded approximately $35,000 on their claims, and the defendants were 
awarded approximately $11,500 on their counterclaim. The plaintiffs apparently 
accepted payment of the net judgment, and the defendants moved to dismiss the plain-
tiffs' appeal. The court denied this motion, explaining that "the general rule just stated 
[that acceptance of payment waives the right to appeal] does not usually prevent an 
appeal as to separate and independent claims where the controversy has not so come to 
rest." Id,, at 1143 (emphasis added). The same rationale applies to Prime's appeal of 
the dismissal of its counterclaim. 
3
 Similarly, estoppel would not apply because Mitchell could not prove that 
Prime took actions inconsistent with the intent to appeal the dismissal of its counter-
claim, that Mitchell relied on any such actions, or that Mitchell would suffer prejudice 
if Prime were allowed to appeal. See, e.g.. S & G. Inc. v. Intermountain Power 
Aeencv. 913 P.2d 735, 741 (Utah 1996). There is absolutely nothing inconsistent 
between Prime's stipulation to the amount of the judgment on Mitchell's claim and 
Prime's present challenge to the dismissal of its own counterclaim. Mitchell could not 
show any reliance, either. If Mitchell had thought that the stipulated judgment was a 
final, absolute resolution of the entire dispute between himself and Prime, he certainly 
would have raised this argument in his motion for summary disposition, which he never 
did. (See Motion for Summary Disposition, filed with the Utah Supreme Court in this 
matter on May 29, 1998.) Finally, Mitchell obviously cannot claim any prejudice, as 
the stipulated judgment awarded Mitchell all the relief he sought from Prime. 
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D. The appeal should proceed on the merits. 
"The right to an appeal is a valuable and constitutional right and ought not to be 
denied except where it is clear the right has been lost or abandoned." Adamson v. 
Brockbank. 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (1947) (emphasis added). Finding a 
waiver in this situation would lead to absurd and counterproductive results, and it 
would "exalt form over substance" in such a way as to completely ignore the realities 
of what happened before the trial court and what Prime is seeking in this appeal. Cf. 
Trover. 866 P.2d at 531 n.2. In essence, Mitchell's theory would require a party who 
has lost its counterclaim to fight its opponent's claim tooth and nail, incurring further 
fees and costs and exposing itself to increased damages, even if the party no longer has 
a good faith defense to that claim. Such a ruling would result in an enormous waste of 
time, money, and effort for the parties, attorneys, and witnesses. In addition, judicial 
resources would be needlessly spent on trials over issues that no one really contests 
anyway. Finally, such a scenario would force an attorney into the position of having to 
choose between inadvertently losing his client's right to appeal and subjecting himself 
to possible sanctions for proceeding forward with trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b). 
Mitchell is simply grasping at unsupported technicalities in an attempt to deny 
Prime its right to appeal the trial court's order granting summary judgment. However, 
there is no basis for Mitchell's claim of a defect in Prime's appeal. Therefore, Prime 
requests that the Court ignore Mitchell's baseless contention and instead address the 
merits of Prime's appeal. 
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POINT TWO 
BECAUSE THE CONTRACT REQUIRED MITCHELL TO TAKE REAL 
ESTATE EMPLOYMENT IN PRIME'S NAME, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PRIME'S CLAIM FOR 
DAMAGES FOR MITCHELL'S "OUTSIDE" REAL ESTATE ACTIVITBES. 
The only question this Court needs to answer on this issue is the following: "Is 
it reasonable to read and apply a contract in accordance with its plain language?" The 
answer to this question is obviously yes; it must at least be reasonable to read and 
apply a contract in accordance with its plain language. Consequently, the trial court 
erred in granting partial summary judgment on this point. 
Paragraph eleven of the agreement plainly provides that Mitchell was required to 
take all employment in connection with the real estate business in Prime's name: 
"Agent agrees that any and all listings of property and all employment in connection 
with the real estate business shall be taken in the name of Broker." (Agreement 5 11 
(emphasis added), R. 860, App'ee Br. Ex. 4.) Instead, Mitchell undisputedly used 
Prime's office, Prime's staff, Prime's equipment, and Prime's materials to engage in 
real estate business for his own exclusive benefit. Mitchell has not offered any 
argument that his Fong/Red Point activities were not connected with the real estate 
business. Therefore, Mitchell clearly breached his contract with Prime, and the trial 
court's ruling was erroneous. 
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A. Prime's right to recover damages for Mitchell's breach of paragraph eleven 
of the agreement is not eliminated by paragraph four. 
Paragraph four of the parties' contract does not defeat Prime's claim. Mitchell 
relies in particular on the second sentence of that paragraph, which reads as follows: 
Agent agrees to perform no other activities in association with Broker, 
except to solicit and obtain listings and sales, leases, representation 
agreements or management contracts] of property, for the parties' mutual 
benefit, and to do so in accordance with law and the ethical and 
professional standards as required in Paragraph 5 of this Agreement. 
(Id. 1 4, R. 859.) This passage does not excuse Mitchell's conduct or prevent Prime 
from recovering the damages it sustained as a result of Mitchell's actions. 
First, nothing in paragraph four, paragraph eleven, or the rest of the parties' 
contract suggests that the language in paragraph four ("solicit and obtain listings and 
sales, leases, [etc.]") was intended as a limitation on the meaning of the words used in 
paragraph eleven. If the same meaning had been intended for paragraphs four and 
eleven, the same language would have been used. Instead, because the language of 
paragraph eleven Call employment in connection with the real estate business") is 
much broader than the language used in paragraph four, it must be inferred that 
paragraph eleven was intended to have a broader meaning. Ct 17A Am. Jur. 2d 
Contracts § 359, at 383 (1991) ("It is a familiar rule that, other things being equal, 
words used in a certain sense in one part of an instrument are deemed to have been 
used in the same sense in another."). 
Second, this Court should flatly reject Mitchell's assertion that the language 
"Agent agrees to perform no other activities in association with Broker" actually pro-
-9-
hibits Prime and Mitchell from engaging in other activities together. This interpretation 
makes no sense, as there is no reason why two parties would ever contract with each 
other not to engage in certain activities together: If parties do not want to do something 
together, they simply do not do it. Instead of being a mutual agreement to refrain from 
engaging in activities together, the language of paragraph four simply means that 
Mitchell was not committing to perform other activities. In the first sentence of para-
graph four, Mitchell agreed to "work diligently and use [his] best efforts to sell, lease, 
or rent any and all real estate listed with Broker, [and] to solicit additional listings and 
customers for Broker." (Id 14, R. 859.) The second sentence of that paragraph (the 
one relied on by Mitchell) simply makes clear that Mitchell has not obligated himself to 
perform any additional activities.4 
However, even though Mitchell did not obligate himself to perform additional 
real estate activities, he did in fact engage in such additional activities: the Fong/Red 
Point real estate development project. And under paragraph eleven, Mitchell was 
required to engage in such real estate business activities on behalf of Prime. 
B. Paragraph eleven must be interpreted according to its plain language to 
prevent the sort of conduct that occurred here. 
The broad language used in paragraph eleven serves an important purpose: to 
prevent an agent from attempting to avoid paying his or her broker a fair share of 
commissions by structuring a real estate transaction so that it technically does not fall 
4
 Again, at the very least, this language is susceptible to two reasonable 
interpretations (one as a prohibition, one as a limitation on obligation), which renders it 
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within the narrow list of activities specified in paragraph four. Paragraph eleven 
eliminates an agent's incentive to engage in such charades, and it obviates the need for 
a court to scrutinize an agent's activities and determine whether those activities fall 
within the definitions of "listings," "representation agreements," "management con-
tracts," etc. Instead, as long as an agent chooses to take advantage of the broker's 
assistance and support, he or she must allow the broker to participate in any proceeds 
obtained from employment in the "real estate business," whatever form that employ-
ment happens to take on paper. Of course, if the agent wishes to engage in such activ-
ities without his or her broker, he or she is free to terminate the contract at any time. 
(Agreement 1 12, R. 860.) 
It is essential that paragraph eleven be applied according to its plain language to 
prevent Mitchell from profiting from his own dishonest conduct. Mitchell came to 
Prime with no prior real estate experience, and Prime provided Mitchell with extensive 
training, with customer lists, and with other benefits. Mitchell responded by working 
behind Prime's back, using Prime's own facilities to engage in his own "separate" real 
estate projects. When exposed, even Mitchell acknowledged that his actions were 
wrong, and he agreed that Prime was entitled to share in the proceeds of the project 
pursuant to the parties' contract. If the summary judgment is allowed to stand, 
Mitchell will end up benefiting from his own malfeasance, and Prime will be left with 
nothing. There is no good reason to allow such a result. 
ambiguous, and summary judgment is still inappropriate. 
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C. Summary judgment on this point should be reversed. 
Once again, it is certainly reasonable to conclude that by engaging in real estate 
development activities, Mitchell was engaging in "employment in connection with the 
real estate business." This interpretation is supported by the plain language of the 
agreement, by the understandings of both parties to the agreement, and by other extrin-
sic evidence.5 Thus, because the agreement is reasonably susceptible to an interpret-
ation that would render Mitchell liable for breach of contract, the trial court's grant of 
partial summary judgment was inappropriate and should be reversed. See R & R 
Energies v. Mother Earth Indus.. 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997). 
POINT THREE 
MITCHELL CLEARLY BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY USING PRIME'S 
PROPRIETARY MATERIALS AFTER HIS TERMINATION, AND UTAH LAW 
ALLOWS PRIME TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR THAT BREACH. 
Finally, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Prime's 
counterclaim for damages for Mitchell's use of Prime's materials after his termination. 
Mitchell voluntarily agreed not to use information or materials obtained from Prime's 
files, and he clearly breached that agreement by engaging in transactions with Prime's 
clients and by using Prime's financial statements, client lists, and other information. 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, Utah law does not prohibit enforcement of the 
5
 Prime submitted extrinsic evidence establishing that Mitchell's activities were 
covered by the parties' contract. (Deposition of Steve Urry, R. 838:11 - 839:4, 840:9 -
841:1, 841:18 - 842:15, 843:1-25, App't Br. Ex. 3; Affidavit of William K. Martin 1 
4, R. 876-77, App't Br. Ex. 6.) See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assn. 907 P.2d 
- I O . 
contract in this situation. Therefore, summary judgment on this point must be reversed 
as well. 
Mitchell does not present a single case or other authority suggesting that Utah 
law precludes Prime from recovering damages for Mitchell's actual conduct. Instead, 
Mitchell claims that he is excused from living up to his agreement simply because para-
graph eighteen might be unenforceable as a covenant not to compete if applied to some 
other situation. This is nonsense. 
A. Paragraph eighteen is not unenforceable as a covenant not to compete. 
First, paragraph eighteen is not a "covenant not to compete," for the simple 
reason that paragraph eighteen does not prevent Mitchell from competing with Prime. 
Paragraph eighteen simply states that Mitchell cannot use Prime's own materials in 
doing so, and Utah law allows such a provision to be enforced. Robbins v. Finlay. 645 
P.2d 623 (Utah 1982); see also Metcalfe Investments, Inc. v. Garrison. 919 P.2d 1356 
(Alaska 1996). Mitchell contends that "information or materials gained from [Prime's] 
files or business" must necessarily include all general knowledge Mitchell obtained 
from working as a real estate agent, but there is no reason to think that this would be a 
proper interpretation. Paragraph eighteen plainly refers to "information" or "materials" 
gained from Prime's "files or business"; it would be unreasonable to read this as 
264, 267-68 (Utah 1995). 
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including all of the general knowledge that every real estate agent learns from working 
in the business.6 
More importantly, however, this Court need not determine whether Prime could 
use paragraph eighteen to prevent Mitchell from using his general real estate know-
ledge, because Prime is not suing Mitchell for using his general knowledge. Instead, 
Prime is suing Mitchell for using specific information (names of clients) gained from 
Prime's business and specific materials (financial statements, client lists, etc.) taken 
from Prime's files, for Mitchell's own exclusive benefit, and to the detriment of Prime. 
As explained in Prime's opening brief, Utah law clearly allows an employer and an 
employee to agree to protect the employer against this sort of unfair competition.7 
B. The lack of an explicit geographical restriction in paragraph eighteen is 
irrelevant. 
Mitchell's argument about geographical restrictions is yet another red herring. 
Because paragraph eighteen is not a covenant not to compete, geographical restrictions 
are not required. Moreover, the contractual prohibition on using Prime's information 
and materials is geographically self-restricting, depending on which materials Mitchell 
utilized: If Mitchell improperly used a list of Prime's clients in Salt Lake County, then 
6
 To use one of Mitchell's own examples, it would be a stretch to consider 
Mitchell's experience in using a Real Estate Purchase Contract as "information." 
7
 Mitchell claims that a contract should not be rewritten to alleviate a contracting 
party from its own mistake, and that instead it should be "'construe[d] . . . according to 
its terms as written.'" (App'ee Br. at 21 (quotation omitted).) This is a curious 
argument for Mitchell to make, to say the least, as it is Mitchell who is seeking to be 
relieved from the plain language of his own agreement. Prime is not seeking to have 
the contractual language changed; Prime is simply asking to have the contract enforced 
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the effect of paragraph eighteen would be limited to Salt Lake County. On the other 
hand, if Mitchell took advantage of a list of potential clients in another state, then those 
areas of that state would be within the prohibition as well. But the prohibition would 
be enforceable either way. 
Mitchell fails in his attempt to distinguish System Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon. 669 
P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). In System Concepts, the Utah Supreme Court held that even a 
blanket covenant not to compete was enforceable without explicit geographical restric-
tions, because that covenant was "impliedly limited to the area in which SCI has been 
and is seeking its market." IdL at 427. This reasoning controls in our case. Mitchell 
attempts to distinguish System Concepts by pointing out that there was nothing special 
or unique about Mitchell's duties with Prime, but this does not matter. The "special, 
unique, or extraordinary" standard discussed in System Concepts is relevant only in 
determining whether a covenant not to compete can be enforced at all; this standard has 
nothing to do with the adequacy of the restrictions contained within the covenant. See 
id. at 426. The "special, unique, or extraordinary" standard is not relevant to the 
present case, because, once again, paragraph eighteen is not a covenant not to compete. 
C. The Utah Code provisions on real estate agents and brokers do not preclude 
enforcement of paragraph eighteen as written. 
Finally, enforcement of paragraph eighteen would not violate Utah real estate 
law, because paying damages to Prime for breaching the agreement could not possibly 
cause Mitchell to retroactively "affiliate with" or "represent" Prime. See Utah Code 
as agreed to by Mitchell. 
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Ann. §§ 61-2-10(3), 61-2-11(5). Prime's claim to a share of the commissions Mitchell 
earned from his improper activities is simply Prime's theory as to the proper measure 
of its damages. The measure of damages for Mitchell's breach of the agreement is not 
before this Court, as Mitchell did not raise any such issue in his motion for partial 
summary judgment; instead, he moved only on the ground that paragraph eighteen is an 
unenforceable covenant not to compete. (Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 
226-27; Memorandum in Support of Motion, R. 228-41.) If Mitchell believes that 
Prime's proposed measure of damages for his breach of the agreement is improper, 
Mitchell will be free to raise that argument on remand. 
D. Fundamental principles of contract law require that paragraph eighteen be 
applied as written. 
The oft-stated purpose of contract law is to give effect to the intentions of the 
parties as expressed in their agreements. E.g.. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). In signing the agreement and taking advantage of die 
benefits offered by Prime, Mitchell voluntarily agreed to refrain from using Prime's 
proprietary information after his termination. No one forced Mitchell to sign the 
agreement; he chose to do so of his own free will, and in reliance on the agreement 
Prime allowed Mitchell access to the client lists and other valuable proprietary 
materials. Prime simply asks that Mitchell be held to his agreement. 
In granting summary judgment, the trial court completely voided a key part of 
the agreement because paragraph eighteen might be interpreted as applying to another 
situation, and applying it in that other situation would be improper. However, this 
Court need not concern itself with what hypothetically would happen if Mitchell had 
used only his general knowledge in competing against Prime. That is not what is at 
issue in this case. Regardless of whether paragraph eighteen might be applicable in 
some other situation that Mitchell might think up, it clearly applies here, and applying 
it here is clearly consistent with Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Prime Commercial, Inc., therefore respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment dismissing Prime's 
counterclaim against Appellee Brent Mitchell and remand the action to the trial court 
for further proceedings on the counterclaim. Appellant Prime also requests that this 
Court award Prime the costs incurred in bringing this appeal under Rule 34 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED March H , 1999. 
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